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Abstract—The advanced electronic units with wireless
capabilities inside modern vehicles have, enhanced the
driving experience, but also introduced a myriad of security
problems due to the inherent limitations of the internal
communication protocol. In the last two decades, a number
of security threats have been identified and accordingly,
security measures have been proposed. In this paper, we
provide a comprehensive review of security threats and
countermeasures for the ubiquitous CAN bus communica-
tion protocol. Our review of the existing literature leads us
to a observation of an overlooked simple, cost-effective, and
incrementally deployable solution. Essentially, a reverse
firewall, referred to in this paper as an icewall, can be an
effective defense against a major class of packet-injection
attacks and many denial of service attacks. We cover the
fundamentals of the icewall in this paper. Further, by
introducing the notion of human-in-the-loop, we discuss the
subtle implications to its security when a human driver is
accounted for.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing sophistication of electronic compo-
nents in modern vehicles has made driving more pleas-
ant, comfortable, and in some cases, safer. The inter-
connectivity of the electronic sensors and actuators, and
their configurability helps fine-tune the driving experi-
ence, in turn leading to increasing the prevalence and
sophistication of these components. Over the years, the
new components and their interplay complexity have led
to user-installable data and firmware updates, requiring
extra-vehicular connectivity over wireless protocols.
At the centre of most intra-vehicular communication
lies the CAN bus which connects the electronic control
units (ECUs) inside the vehicle. At the time of its incep-
tion and subsequent revisions, the CAN specification was
developed to meet the real-time communication needs of
a vehicle [11], [52], [10], without significant concern for
security. Unfortunately, as vehicle manufacturers started
adding remote interfaces to ECUs while still following
the CAN 2.0 standard (which never had a security-
focused revision), the inherent security limitations started
to become an issue. Over the years, a lot of CAN bus
vulnerabilities that can lead to serious consequences have
been identified.
In the vehicle security domain, there are mainly two
(not mutually exclusive) classes of research: the first
class focuses on identifying security threats (vulnera-
bilities, attack surfaces and/or exploits) and the second
class focuses on proposing security measures. One of the
earliest works in identifying the security threats to the
automotive bus systems is that of Wolf et al. in [54]. For
the most part, their work covers potential incentives for
prospective attackers to hack into the bus, the potential
access points that can be used and the safety and comfort
implications of successful attacks. They also look into
general security measures that can be used to protect
access to the bus. Their work, however, fails to provide a
practical example of an attack on the bus, nor it provides
concrete implementation details of the discussed security
measures. Following on their footsteps, few years later,
Koscher et al., in [24], investigate inherent weaknesses
in the CAN protocol, look into flaws in the real-world
implementation of the protocol (deviations from the
standard being one) and perform practical attacks on
the bus. A few years further, Miller and Valasek, in
[29], [31], open up the true range of automotive attack
possibilities. Their work in [29] covers a broad range of
attacks leading to the control of different vehicle func-
tionalities, such as, braking, steering and acceleration,
through physical access to the bus. Similarly, attacks that
can be carried out remotely are discussed in [31].
Somewhat parallel to the discovery of security threats
on the CAN bus, a different body of work started to look
into proposing security solutions to the identified threats
– some of the earlier works in this regard are [35] and
[17]. Claimed by the authors to be the first efficient data
authentication scheme for the automotive network, [35]
is centered on a delayed message authentication based
on compound message authentication codes. Similarly,
[17] covers intrusion detection techniques based on three
detection patterns: increased message frequency, obvious
use of message-IDs and low level communication char-
acteristics to detect potential attacks on the bus. These
two works lay the foundation for a myriad of literature on
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the authentication-based and intrusion-detection-based
security measures in the following years.
Besides the two classes of active research, there is
a great need for a third class of research that surveys
existing works on automotive security and provides
insights. To the best of our knowledge, the literature
contains only a handful of papers [23], [47], [30], [1]
that provide a overview, albeit not extensively, of security
threats to the CAN bus and countermeasures to protect
against them. In [23], the authors survey and identify the
underlying security problems of the in-vehicle network.
They further review architectural security features pro-
posed by other researchers and discuss the deployment of
honeypots and intrusion detection systems that constitute
proposed security measures against potential attacks.
Similarly, the authors of [47] survey some of the com-
mon attack vectors, both local and remote, and discuss
external and internal protection measures to secure the
vehicular communication bus. Likewise, in [30], the
authors discuss a wide class of remote attack surfaces
and vulnerable cyber-physical systems and share their
insights on measures that can be taken to protect against
remote attacks. Similarly, the authors of [1] explore the
security limitations of CAN bus and cover some security
measures that researchers have proposed over the years.
They also look into some potential attack scenarios and
provide the CERT classification of these attack scenarios.
In this paper, we take an extensive approach into
surveying intra-vehicular security, particularly focusing
on the CAN bus communication. We start off by re-
viewing some common attack surfaces that researchers
have practically exploited to gain access to the CAN bus.
Next, we look into safety-critical functionalities that can
be controlled once the internal network is accessed. We
then look into security measures proposed by researchers
over the years and discuss their limitations. Next, we
share our observation of an efficient, cost-effective and
incrementally deployable security solution for the CAN
bus and cover its fundamentals. Finally, we discuss
the subtle implications to the security of the observed
solution when the judgment of a human driver is taken
into account.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II
provides a brief background on CAN and ECUs. Section
III reviews some of the common attack surfaces that can
be exploited to gain access to the CAN bus and safety-
critical vehicle functionalities that can be controlled.
Section IV overviews mitigation techniques proposed
by researchers and explores their limitations. Section V
discusses our observation of an efficient, cost-effective
and incrementally deployable solution for CAN. Finally,
section VI concludes the paper with closing remarks.
II. BACKGROUND ON CAN
To understand vehicle security, it is necessary to first
gain a basic understanding of the controller area network
(CAN) and the Electronic Control Units (ECUs) that
communicate over the CAN bus. This section will detail
CAN operation and provide a context for ECUs.
A. CAN Frames
CAN connects nodes along a bus that is broadcast
in nature, meaning each message is sent to every node
on the bus. Messages do not have a return address.
Instead, nodes interpret whether a message is intended
for them based on metadata describing what type of data
the message holds. A CAN frame can be one of four
types: a data frame, remote frame, an error frame, or an
overload frame. A data frame contains data that is to be
interpreted or processed by the receiver. A remote frame
is used to request transmission of a specific message. An
error frame, which starts with a 6-bit error flag, is used
to indicate an error has occurred, and an overload frame
is used to add a delay between frames [6]. Data frames
are most relevant from the vehicular security point of
view and can be seen below in Figure 1.
Fig. 1: Visual representation of a CAN frame
Table I provides descriptions and bit lengths for each
field within a CAN data frame. A data frame has the
capability of carrying up to 8 bytes of data, but this
is not required. The exact length of the data field is
given in the DLC. Additionally, a 1-byte checksum is
typically contained in the last byte of the data field
to ensure integrity. This checksum is not part of the
CAN protocol, but it is implemented by most vehicle
manufacturers for added security [6]. The identifier field
is perhaps the most important field in a frame besides
the data field itself. As was mentioned earlier, CAN
frames are broadcast to every node on the network.
Frames also do not contain a transmitter or receiver
address. Instead, nodes use the identifier field to
determine if a frame is useful to them. Using a vehicle
example, a frame containing speed data would have
a unique identifier that is used every time any frame
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Field Bits Description
Start-of-
Frame
1 Indicates start of frame
Identifier 1 11 Standard identifier; contains message
priority
Substitute Re-
mote Request
1 Recessive
Identifier Ex-
tension
1 Recessive to indicate an extended ID,
dominant otherwise
Identifier 2 18 Extended identifier; also contains mes-
sage priority
Remote
Transmission
Request
1 Dominant indicates standard data
frame; recessive indicates RTR
Reserved Bits 2 Reserved bits which are set dominant
Data Length
Code (DLC)
4 Indicates number of bytes of data
Data 0-64 Data being transmitted (ranges from 0
to 8 bytes)
Cyclic
Redundancy
Check
15 Used for error detection
CRC Delim-
iter
1 Recessive Bit
Acknowledge-
ment Slot
1 Recessive upon transmittal, dominate
indicates receipt acknowledgement
ACK Delim-
iter
1 Recessive Bit
End-of-Frame 7 All recessive bits
TABLE I: Description of CAN frame segments. Here,
a dominant state is defined as a positive voltage be-
tween the CAN bus data wires, while a recessive state
corresponds to zero voltage between the wires. Unlike
a majority of wired transmission protocols, the CAN
standard associates a logical zero with a dominant state
and a logical one with a recessive state [49].
containing speed data is transmitted over the network,
regardless of the sender. The base frame format allows
for an 11-bit identifier while the extended frame format
allows for a second identifier field containing another
18 bits of identifier data, resulting in a 29-bit identifier.
A frame will contain an extended identifier only if the
Identifier Extension bit is recessive.
B. CAN Access Contention
The identifier field also contains data regarding the
priority of a frame. The priority of a frame is used
to resolve conflict between two nodes attempting to
transmit data over the CAN simultaneously. Once the
CAN bus is idle, a node may immediately issue a frame
for transmittal. It is possible that another node was
waiting for the idle state of the bus and it also issues
a frame for transmittal simultaneously with the other
node. In this situation, the CAN protocol resolves the
issue using an arbitration process based on priority in
which the node that transmitted the frame with the lowest
identifier value receives access to the bus. To determine
this, the contending nodes send their frames one bit at
a time and monitor the output of the bus. The CAN bus
acts as a logical AND gate in this situation, ANDing the
bits from each frame. If a node observes a dominant
(0) bit where it sent a recessive (1) bit, it has lost
the arbitration process and the other competing node
is given access to the CAN bus. The winner can then
broadcast its message over the CAN and the loser is put
back in receiving mode where it waits to transmit its
message until the CAN is detected idle again. Once the
arbitration winner is finished transmitting its message,
there is a 3-bit buffer and then the CAN bus is again open
for access – the node that lost the original arbitration
process may now again attempt to broadcast its message.
This protocol ensure that frames with higher priority are
always given first access to the CAN bus [6], [40].
C. CAN Error Handling
Most electronic communication is subject to bit errors,
CAN included. The purpose of the error handling proto-
col is not only to detect errors, but also to ensure proper
functionality of the network in the presence of errors,
which is vitally important in a safety-critical vehicular
network. Each node along the CAN monitors the frames
being transmitted and attempts to detect errors. Each
node also contains two counters, one for transmittal
errors and one for receipt errors, that are incremented
when a transmitter detects a fault in its own message or
a listening node detects a fault in an observed node,
respectively. The CAN protocol includes at least five
methods for error detection [26]:
Bit Monitoring: When a node transmits a message over
the CAN bus, it also monitors the output of the bus. If the
observed output of the bus is different than the message
that was transmitted, then a bit error is issued. This,
however, does not occur during the arbitration phase that
takes place during CAN access contention.
Bit Stuffing: When a node transmits five consecutive bits
of the same value, it will add a sixth bit of the opposite
value to the sequence. Receiver nodes will then remove
this bit upon receipt. If a receiver reads a frame with
five consecutive bits of same value and the sixth bit of
opposite value is not present, then the receiver issues a
stuff error.
Frame Check: The CAN standard fixes certain parts
of each frame to specific values. These areas are the
CRC delimiter, the ACK delimiter, End of Frame, and
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the intermission between frames. If a node on the CAN
observes one of these areas to disagree with the standard,
it issues a form error.
Acknowledgement Check: When a node receives a
message frame, it is expected to send a dominant bit in
the Acknowledgement Slot indicating that the message
was correctly received. Every node is expected to do
this, regardless of whether the message was intended for
it or not. The transmitter sends a recessive bit in this
field when the message is sent. If the transmitter does
not observe a dominant bit in the ACK slot, it issues an
acknowledgement error.
Cyclic Redundancy Check: Each frame contains a 15-
bit Cyclic Redundancy Check. If a receiver observes a
different CRC than what it calculates itself, it issues a
CRC Error.
D. CAN Error Confinement
If a node on the bus detects an error using one
of the checking mechanisms outlined in the previous
subsection, it will transmit an error frame consisting of
an error flag. Other nodes will then detect the error flag
and discard the current broadcast message. Every node
on the network maintains two counters: a Transmit Error
Counter (TEC) and a Receive Error Counter (REC) [26].
There are three states that a node can exist in: Error
Active, Error Passive, and Bus Off. A node is in the Error
Active state by default in which it will transmit an active
error frame (with an active error flag) each time an error
is detected and then proceed to re-transmit the message.
When errors are detected by a transmitter its TEC is
incremented by 8. When a receiver detects an error its
REC is incremented by 1. Thus, the TEC is typically
incremented at a faster rate than the REC because the
transmitter is often the source of the error. With each
successfully transmitted message, both error counters are
decremented. If either of a node’s error counter exceed
127, that node will enter the Error Passive state in which
it will transmit a passive error frame (with a passive
error flag) if an error is detected. Unlike the active error
flag which consists of 6 dominant bits, the passive error
flag consists of 6 recessive bits and therefore, does not
interfere with the bus traffic. The error counters of an
Error Passive node proceed to increment at normal rates.
If either counter value is incremented past 255, the node
will enter a Bus Off state in which it will not transmit
anything whatsoever over the bus [26].
E. Electronic Control Units
A modern vehicle is comprised of many embedded
components controlling various vehicle functionalities.
These components are known as Electronic Control
Units (ECUs). ECUs can control trivial tasks such as
opening windows and unlocking doors or more compli-
cated tasks that are vital to vehicle functionality such
as anti-lock braking systems and collision prevention
systems [36].
The ECUs make up the nodes of a vehicle’s com-
munication network. ECUs may be present on multiple
networks such as Local Interconnect network (LIN),
Media-oriented Systems Transport (MOST), or the CAN
[36]. This paper will only focus on CAN traffic. Every
ECU on the bus is connected to every other ECU and
due to the broadcast nature of the CAN, every ECU sees
every message that is broadcast. To determine whether
a message is intended for it, an ECU will look at the
identifier of every message and interpret the meta-data
to determine if the contents of the message pertain to
it. Most vehicles contain a high speed bus for critical
functions and a low speed bus for non-critical functions.
Additionally, there may be bridge nodes connecting the
high and low speed bus, making it possible for every
ECU on the network to communicate with every other
node. A modern vehicle may contain over 80 ECUs
connected over its network. Common ECUs present in
modern vehicles are compiled in table II 1 [31], [29],
[44], [8], [37]. Similarly table III shows typical data
produced and consumed by some of the major ECUs on
the bus. This provides a good context for understanding
the different types of ECUs present on the CAN network
and the types of data they produce and consume on the
bus.
III. ATTACK SURFACES AND EXPLOITS
In this section, we look into the contemporary state
of vehicular security by providing a brief overview
on vehicular attack surfaces and reviewing the existing
works related to vehicular attacks. We briefly look into
attacks that are not CAN-focused, then move on to
attacks that are focused on gaining access to the CAN
bus. Under attacks that are CAN-focused, there are two
ways to gain access to the bus: physical access and
remote access. We briefly cover common attack surfaces
1Pertaining to the fact that vehicle manufacturers have tendency to
name a similarly functioning ECU differently from other manufactur-
ers, the list may contain redundancies.
2Integrated with EBCM
3PCS and LKAS are commonly integrated as a part of the Driving
Support ECU in the Toyota Prius
4ABS, Electronic Brake Force Distribution, Brake Assist, Traction
Control and Enhanced Vehicle Skid Control are commonly integrated
as a part of the EBCM (Skid Control ECU) in the Toyota Prius
5As a proxy to Remote Engine Starter ECU
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• Anti-lock Brakes System
Module (ABS)
• AHLM Module (Headlamp
Leveling)
• Adaptive Cruise Control Mod-
ule (ACC)
• Body Control Module (BCM)
• CCB Connector (Star CAN C
Body)
• CCIP Connector (Star CAN C
IP)
• DLC (Data Link Connector)
• Electronic Parking Brake
Module (EPBM)
• Electric Power Steering Mod-
ule (EPSM/PSM)
• Electronic Shift Module
• Forward Facing Camera Mod-
ule
• Instrument Panel Cluster/-
Driver Information Center
(IPC/DIC)
• Occupant Classification
• Occupant Restraint Controller
• Park Assist Module (PAM)
• Power-train Control Module
(PCM)
• Radio Module
• Radio Frequency Hub Module
• Steering Control Module
• Steering Column Lock Module
• Transmission Control Module
(TCM)
• AMP Amplifier
• Door Driver Module
• External Disc Module (EDM)
• Heated Seats Module (HSM)
• Heating, Ventilation, Air Con-
ditioning Module (HVAC)
• Integrated Center Stack Switch
Module (ICS)
• LBSS Sensor (Blind Spot Left
Rear)
• MSM Module (Memory Seat
Driver)
• Passenger Door Module
(PDM)
• Power Liftgate Module
(PLGM)
• RBSS Sensor (Blind Spot
Right Rear)
• Engine Control Module
(ECM)
• Electronic Brake Control
Module (EBCM)
• Telematics Module
• Remote Control Door Lock
Receiver (RCDLR)
• Sensing and Diagnostics Mod-
ule (SDM)
• Theft Deterrent Module
• Tire Pressure Monitoring Sys-
tem (TPMS)
• Traction Control Module
• Air-conditioning Protection
Unit
• Collision Warning Unit
• Instrumentation Control Unit
• Data Loggers Unit
• Communication Unit
• Security Alarm Unit
• Air Suspension control Unit
• Autonomous Emergency
Steering System
• Pre-Collision System (PCS)
• Lane Keep Assist System
(LKAS)
• Restraint Control Module
(RCM)
• Steering Column Control
Module (SCCM)
• Gauge Control Module (GCM)
• Battery Condition Monitor
Module (BCMM)
• Electric Servo Brake Control
Unit
• Power Management Control
ECU (PMC)
• Skid Control ECU
TABLE II: Common ECUs found in modern vehicles
that allow these types of accesses. We note that attacks
requiring physical access are often impractical as the
methods for conducting those attacks are less realistic
for malicious purposes than for remote attacks.
The first step in arbitrarily altering a vehicle’s behavior
is to get malicious code running on a particular compo-
nent. This can be accomplished through gaining access to
a particular component of the vehicle, typically an ECU
connected to the CAN, via physical or wireless channels.
As we will see, the range of physical and wireless access
can vary based on the attack.
A. Non-CAN Attacks
1) Tire Pressure Monitoring System: The purpose
of a Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS) is to
ECU Data consumed from the
CAN bus (from)
Data produced to the CAN
bus (to)
ABS 2 • Deceleration data (ACC) • Deceleration acknowledge-
ment data (ACC)
ACCM • Accelerator pedal position
(PCM)
• Vehicle configuration data
(BCM)
• Brake pedal applied
(PCM)
• Cruise control override
(PCM)
• Ignition Status (BCM)
• Steering wheel switch
speed control (SCCM)
• Stability control event in
progress (ABS)
• Traction Control event in
progress (?)
• Vehicle lateral
acceleration (RCM)
• Vehicle longitudinal
acceleration (RCM)
• Vehicle yaw rate (RCM)
• Adaptive cruise control
Brake deceleration request
(ABS)
• Adaptive cruise control
gap setting (IPC)
• Adaptive cruise control
message display (IPC)
PCS 3 • Yaw rate and Acceleration
(Yaw Rate and Acceleration
Sensor)
• Steering angle (Steering
Angle Sensor)
• Vehicle Speed (EBCM)
• Pre-collision brake request
(EBCM)
• Information and warnings
indicating PCS status (Com-
bination Meter Assembly)
• Seat belt operation request
(Seat Belt Control ECU)
• Brake assist standby re-
quest (EBCM)
LKAS • Vehicle Speed (EBCM)
• Yaw Rate and Accelera-
tion (Yaw Rate and Accel-
eration Sensor)
• Steering wheel angle
(PSM)
• Information and warnings
indicating LKA status
(Combination Meter
Assembly)
PSM • Engine Speed (ECM)
• Vehicle Speed (EBCM)
• Steering wheel angle
(PAM/IPAS)
• Steering wheel angle
(LKAS)
• Signal to limit electrical
use (HVAC)
• Warning signal indicat-
ing malfunctioning or low
battery voltage (Combination
Meter Assembly)
EBCM
4
• Steering angle (Steering
Angle Sensor)
• Accelerator pedal position
(ECM)
• Regenerative brake con-
trol value (PMC)
• Brake request signals
(Driving Support ECU)
• Throttle position (ECM)
• Engine speed (ECM)
• Parking brake switch sig-
nal (Main Body ECU)
• Warning signal indicat-
ing malfunctioning, parking
brake on or parking fluid
level low (Combination Me-
ter Assembly)
• Regenerative brake signal
(PMC)
• Vehicle speed (PSM)
ECM • Accelerator Pedal Position
(PMC)
• Signal of throttle control
request
• Engine immobilization
signal (Certification ECU)
• Throttle position (EBCM)
• Engine speed (EBCM)
• Warning signal indicat-
ing malfunctioning (Combi-
nation Meter Assembly)
Main
Body
ECU
• Remote certification
information5 (Certification
ECU)
• Parking brake switch sig-
nal (EBCM)
• Start engine signal (Certi-
fication ECU)
• Information about each
door and the luggage com-
partment door (Certification
ECU)
TABLE III: Typical data consumed and produced by
various ECUs on a CAN bus
5
continuously monitor the air pressure of a vehicle’s tires
and alert the operator if a substantially dip in pressure is
detected. The TPMS consists of sensors inside each tire
to monitor the pressure as well as an ECU responsible
for communicating with the sensors and alerting the
vehicle operator of an under-inflated tire by sending
messages over the CAN to a central vehicle computer,
typically a TCM [20]. A wired connection from the
sensor to the ECU is not feasible due to the rotating
wheel, thus, a wireless communication protocol is used
to send information. The authors of [20] used reverse
engineering tactics in order to discover the proprietary
information behind the wireless communication such as
the modulation and encoding schemes and the message
formats, the details of which are documented in the refer-
enced work. After learning the necessary protocols, they
were able to receive and spoof TPMS messages at ranges
up to 40m using a cheap antenna and basic low noise
amplifier. It is assumed this range could be increased
using improved equipment. This attack does, however,
only give limited access to the CAN. The publishers of
the attack were not able to gain unauthorized access to
the TPMS ECU but were instead able to spoof messages
to the ECU causing it to alert the driver of low tire
pressure despite the pressure being adequate. While this
is not necessarily a direct risk to the driver and passenger
safety, it poses concerns as to the possibilities of further
malicious intent based on a driver’s reaction to these
messages.
2) KeeLoq Cipher: KeeLoq is a block cipher with
32-bit blocks that is widely used in remote keyless-
entry systems despite its short, 64-bit key size. There
are numerous attacks on the cipher employing methods
such as the slide, guess and determine, fixed points,
and algebraic techniques [7], [4], [3]. The authors of
[19] were able to craft a more efficient attack based on
the slide technique combined with a novel meet-in-the-
middle attack. The optimized version of the attack uses
216 known plaintexts with a time complexity of 244.5
KeeLoq encryptions (528 rounds). The total run-time for
the attack is 500 days and can be parallelized across x
CPUs for an effective run-time of 500/x days.
B. CAN Attacks
1) Media player: The authors of [5] identified two
vulnerabilities within the media player. First, the player
has an update capability that automatically recognizes
a CD formatted to the ISO 9660 standard that contains
a specifically named file. The system then displays a
message on the display and if the user does not respond
with the correct input, the media player firmware will be
re-flashed with the data on the CD.
Second, knowing that the media player must be ca-
pable of parsing audio files, after reverse-engineering
the firmware, they located a file reading function that
makes strong assumptions about the length of the input.
They also discovered the parser for a particular type of
audio file (WMA extension for Windows Media Player
audio files) allows for arbitrary length reads. Together
these two discoveries allow for a buffer overflow attack.
The attack is difficult to execute however. The buffer
to overflow is not on the stack, but is instead in the
BSS (Basic Service Set) segment [5]. This complicates
the attack because there are no clear control variables to
overwrite in the BSS segment and immediately following
the segment there are state variables that are checked
frequently. Arbitrarily overwriting these would crash the
system. To execute this attack, the authors developed
a debugger that communicates over an unused serial
port on the media player. The debugger can then be
used to analyze system memory and identify function
pointers to overwrite. Finally, they modified a WMA file
that exploits the buffer overflow vulnerability and allows
CAN packets to be sent across the bus. This audio file
could be burned to a CD and inserted into the player or
the file could be on a separate device such as a cell phone
that is then connected to the media player via USB.
2) OBD-II: The on-board diagnostics (OBD-II) port
is used by technicians when servicing a vehicle and, for
this reason, it has access to all CAN buses within a
vehicle. All vehicles in the U.S. are required to support
the PassThru standard [5]. This is a Windows based
API that provides a software interface to communicate
with a vehicle’s internal networks and is typically imple-
mented through having a PassThru device that connects
directly to a vehicle’s OBD-II port. A laptop used by
the service technician is then able to connect, wired
or wireless, to the device. The laptop has a Windows
library installed that allows it to communicate with the
vehicle’s CAN bus via the PassThru device. The authors
of [5] identified the most commonly used PassThru
device for their particular vehicle but do not disclose
the manufacturer. The device is network compatible and
they were able to identify two vulnerabilities for the
device. First, anyone on the same network can connect
to the device with ease. This means if an attacker can
gain access to a dealership or service center’s private
network, through any method of their choosing, they are
able to connect to the device and communicate directly
with the CAN. Second, they discovered it possible to
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compromise the PassThru device itself. If an attacker is
able to compromise the device itself and install malware,
they would then be able to affect any car the affected
PassThru device connects to.
When the PassThru device boots, it broadcasts its
IP address and TCP port for receiving client requests.
The connection between the device and a client device
is unauthenticated so gaining access to the network is
the only deterrent. The authors of [5] discovered an
input validation bug within the implementation of an
API protocol designed for network configuration that
allows an attacker to run shell scripts on the device.
Thus, in order to carry out this attack, an attacker could
create a program that contacts to a PassThru device
that is broadcasting its network information, exploit the
input validation bug to execute arbitrary shell commands,
and install malicious files that are designed to send
pre-programmed CAN messages to whatever vehicle
the PassThru device is connected to. Presumably, the
message would contain data to install malware onto the
vehicle’s telematics unit. The attacker could also modify
the program to make it a worm that spreads to other
PassThru devices on the network after infecting one.
Thus, an attacker could potentially install malware on
hundreds of vehicles at a dealership/service center with
their only major roadblock being gaining access to the
private network.
In addition to a PassThru device, an ECOM device
can also be used to interface with the OBD-II port and
read and write to the CAN bus, albeit an adapter may be
required for connector compatibility. The authors of [29]
customized an ECOM cable to interface with the OBD-
II port and gain access to the internal network. They
used the accompanying ECOM API to inject both normal
and diagnostic CAN packets and control various vehicle
functionalities including, but not limited to, the steering,
brakes, speedometer readings, lights and horns. Further,
they were also able to perform denial of service attacks
to limit vehicle functionalities such as the steering.
Clearly, an OBD-II port is a convenient means to
gain access to the CAN bus and inject CAN packets.
Although researchers often use it to demonstrate the
wide range of possibilities of controlling various vehicle
functionalities via carefully crafted CAN messages, the
OBD-II port in itself is an inexpedient attack vector to an
outside attacker. However, it can be an interesting attack
vector to an inside attacker with a potentially different
objective, such as altering odometer readings or even
reverse engineering proprietary ECU firmwares.
3) Bluetooth: Most modern vehicles are equipped
with Bluetooth functionality for hands-free calling, me-
dia, etc. which is typically found in the telematics
module. The authors of [5] were able to reverse en-
gineer the program responsible for handling Bluetooth
functionality of a test vehicle. Inside the program, they
found an easily exploitable call to strcpy that creates an
easy buffer overflow opportunity for any paired device.
Additionally, rather than pairing her own device, an
attacker could instead compromise a different device that
is already paired with a vehicle. To demonstrate this,
the authors create a Trojan Horse program that monitors
Bluetooth connections on an Android phone and, if the
connecting device is a telematics module, executes the
buffer overflow attack and sends a malicious payload to
the vehicle.
Attacks leveraging Bluetooth capabilities are not lim-
ited to already paired devices, however. The authors of
[5] were also able to sniff the Bluetooth MAC address of
the vehicle using Bluesniff [46] which required a previ-
ously paired device be present in the vehicle. Further, as
the bluetooth unit of the test vehicle did not require any
user interaction for pairing, they were able to brute-force
the PIN and pair a new bluetooth device. However, the
authors note that the rate at which PINs can be tested
and the total time for a successful brute-force entirely
depends on the response time of the vehicle’s Bluetooth
stack.
4) Telematics Control Module (TCM): Long-range
wireless access can commonly be associated with the
telematics module and its cellular network capabilities.
Modern vehicles are equipped with cell-phone interfaces
typically containing a voice channel for phone calls,
an SMS channel for text message, and a data channel
for navigation purposes [5]. This section will focus on
the voice channel. All cellular data is routed through a
Telematics Call Center (TCC) that is operated by the
vehicle manufacturer. Normally, when a call is made to
the vehicle, the vehicle will first send a random, three
byte challenge packet to the TCC and an authentication
timer is started. The TCC then hashes the challenge with
an 8-byte pre-shared key to generate a response to the
challenge that must be received by the vehicle within 12
seconds of the challenge packet being sent. If the time
limit is exceeded or the challenge response is incorrect,
the vehicle sends an error packet and ends the attempted
connection.
Through rigorous reverse-engineering tactics, the au-
thors of [5] were able to create an artificial TCC through
which they were able to communicate with a vehicle,
sending arbitrary cellular data packets. Two vulnerabil-
ities within the authentication protocol were discovered
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that can be compounded with a separate vulnerability
within the interface to the TCC. First, the implementation
of the random challenge is hardly random. The key is
generated by performing a certain algorithm on a seed.
However, the seed is static and the random challenge
generator is reset whenever the telematics unit starts.
This means the random key is the same every time the
telematics unit starts, allowing an attacker to easily au-
thenticate with the vehicle. Second, the code tasked with
parsing the authentication challenge request responses
contains an error that authenticates incorrect responses.
For carefully formatted incorrect responses, roughly 1
out of every 256 will be interpreted as correct as a result
of this error. This is the case as long as the random
key generator is not reinitialized, starting back over with
the seed mentioned above. This means that this error
will occur as long as the vehicle remains on when the
incorrect responses are sent.
The interface to the TCC assumes that incoming
packets will not exceed 100 bytes. Thus, input lengths
are not checked, allowing for a buffer overflow. The
payload created by the authors of [5] to mount this
overflow attack was over 300 bytes. However, the inter-
face to the TCC only allows for a 21 bytes per second
throughput. Given the 12 second limit for a response to
the authentication challenge, this vulnerability alone is
not sufficient in gaining access to the telematics module.
Instead the vulnerability in the authentication protocol
must be exploited first. After authentication, the timeout
window is changed from 12 seconds to 60 seconds,
allowing enough time for the buffer overflow attack to
be executed. Only after combining these two attacks can
an attacker execute malicious code on the TCM.
The authors of the aforementioned paper make a note
that the previously mentioned attacks were performed
on vehicles whose manufacturer and make were undis-
closed. Thus, the detailed attacks may be very difficult
to replicate. However, [31] documents an entire remote
exploit chain and discloses the target vehicle, a 2014 Jeep
Cherokee, as well as the specific hardware components
of the vehicle that were used in the exploit. Again, the
exploit relies on the telematics module of the vehicle and
its cellular network capabilities. The telematics module
contains a D-Bus message daemon that is used for inter-
process communication and, using the appropriate D-
Bus service, code can be run using the D-Bus’s execute
method. The authors state that the easiest step from here
is to start an SSH service in order to run commands
from a remote terminal [31]. This will allow an attacker
to control radio, HVAC, and other non-CAN related
functions that are associated with the telematics module.
In order to inject CAN packets and increase the scope
of the attack, further steps must be taken.
The telematics module is able to communicate over
the CAN using a V850 chip with an OMAP chip acting
as an intermediary between the telematics module’s D-
Bus service and the V850. Thus, compromising the V850
chip could provide an attacker with CAN access. To do
this, the authors used reverse engineering tactics to locate
the file responsible for updating the V850. Carefully
modifying this file in order for the V850 to still accept
it as an update file allows the attacker to flash the V850
with the modified firmware, which can be utilized to
send arbitrary CAN messages over the network [31].
The authors of [12] looked into an aftermarket telem-
atics control module that has a standard OBD-II port
interface to connect to a vehicle. The authors found
that a remote attacker can discover and compromise
these devices to take remote control of the vehicle. The
reference TCM that was exploited is one manufactured
by Mobile Devices Ingenierie and commonly used for
insurance purposes. It includes a mini-USB connector
which provides debugging capability and emulates a
network adapter. When debugging is enabled, a web
server and telnet console listen on ports 80 and 23
respectively. However, both these services were found
to not require any form of authentication. On a more
serious security issue, anyone with physical access to the
system (and some expertise) could remove the NAND
flash chip to read and modify its contents. The authors
were able to extract cryptographic keys and certificates
from the NAND dump and use it to access the SSH
service running on the device. Using the key, they were
able to authenticate to the device and read and write
files, execute commands and install software to modify
functionality. The authors of [12] also found that that the
manufacturer of the TCM used the same SSH key on
several of their other TCM devices. Moreover, the same
SSH key could be used to login to the TCM over the
web if the IP address was known. The authors point out
that Network Address Translation used by some cellular
carriers seem to make this task more difficult. However,
they note that that this is dependent on the carrier and
some cellular provider allow direct addressing. The TCM
also exposed an SMS-based interface which supported
the same sets of commands as those by the local debug
interface.
C. Attack Outcomes
Thus far we have discussed multiple methods for
gaining access to the internal vehicular network. Next,
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we look into what can be done once an attacker gains
unauthorized access to the network. In what follows, we
look into documented attacks and the outcomes of such
attacks from the safety point of view. We make a note
that although the attacks were performed on specific
vehicle models, similar attacks are possible on myriad
of other vehicle makes and models. Also, we expect
the outcomes of such attacks to be similar in scope and
severity across all vehicles.
1) Control Over Braking: The authors of [29] experi-
mented on a Toyota Prius that came equipped with a Pre-
Collision System (PCS) that is designed to aid the driver
in the event of an impending collision. One functionality
of the PCS is to slow the vehicle down when it is
approaching a vehicle ahead of it that is traveling at a
slower speed than itself, to avoid a collision. Through
reverse engineering, [29] was able to identify the packet
broadcast over the CAN that is responsible for this
functionality. By replicating this packet, they were able
to completely stop the vehicle, even if the accelerator
pedal is completely depressed. The one caveat for this
method is the packets for this functionality contain an
embedded counter that is checked each time the packet is
received. If this counter is not incremented properly, the
packet is ignored. Thus, the attacker must continuously
send the packet while incrementing the counter in order
for the attack to work properly. This means that it is not
possible to bring the vehicle to an abrupt stop. However,
it may still be abrupt enough to cause serious damage
in certain circumstances such as the case that a vehicle
is approaching rapidly from the rear.
In addition to normal CAN packets that are constantly
broadcast over the bus in order for ECUs to communicate
with one another, diagnostic packets also exist. These
packets are used by service technicians when performing
diagnostic checks. These are typically sent over the
OBD-II port but can also be replicated in the same way
that normal packets can. As shown in [29], it takes just
one of these packets to engage the brakes in the Ford
Focus. The packet specifies how much the brakes should
be applied so it is possible to engage them completely.
However, this packet will only be accepted while the
vehicle is already stopped. Pressing the accelerator after
this packet has been sent will fail to move the vehicle.
An attacker could also, in principle, broadcast a false
speed reading indicating that the vehicle is not moving
in order to engage the brakes while moving.
Another similar diagnostic packet exists for the Ford
Focus that is designed to bleed the brakes [29]. While
the brakes are being bled, the brake pedal physically
cannot be depressed. This packet is only interpreted as
valid when the vehicle is traveling at speeds less than
5 mph. Issuing this packet while a vehicle is parking
near a building or driving in stop-and-go traffic could
potentially cause moderate damage. However, as false
speed packets were sent while abusing the IPAS system
in the Toyota Prius, it could be assumed that false speed
packets could also be generated in this situation, causing
the brakes to not function at arbitrary speeds.
2) Control Over Steering: The authors of [29] were
also able to exploit the Intelligent Park Assist System
(IPAS) of the Toyota Prius that is designed to assist
the driver when attempting to parallel park or back into
a parking space. IPAS is an interesting attack surface
because this system controls the steering of the vehicle
electronically. However, the steering functionality only
works when the vehicle is in reverse and traveling under
4 mph; neither of these conditions allow an attacker to
pose any real threat. Thus, in order to execute this attack,
the attacker must send false speed packets indicating that
the vehicle is traveling less than 4 mph and send false
packets indicating that the vehicle is in reverse. After
taking care of these two issues, an attacker can then
replicate messages from the IPAS to the servo mecha-
nism, the mechanism that moves the steering wheel on
behalf of an ECU to steer the vehicle in an arbitrary
way while the vehicle is operating in drive at any speed.
Steering directions from the IPAS only allow for short,
jerky movement which would not suffice for complete
remote control, but would definitely be enough control
to cause the vehicle to crash at high speeds.
The Prius also comes equipped with a Lane Keep
Assist (LKA) feature that is designed to detect when
a vehicle begins to veer out of is lane and correct the
path accordingly. Contrary to the IPAS, this feature is
designed to work at arbitrary speeds while the vehicle
is in drive. Thus, replicating the packets sent from the
LKA module will be able to control steering. However,
the system is designed to ignore packets requesting the
wheel to turn more than five degrees. This should still
be enough to cause damage to a vehicle traveling at a
high speed on a crowded or very small street.
Besides replicating CAN packets, an attacker can also
flood the CAN causing a denial of service on the CAN
bus. This means that no packets can be delivered over
the CAN bus. Different ECUs react differently when
this happens, but the Power Steering Control Module
(PSCM) in the Ford Focus shuts down completely,
causing it to no longer provide the driver with assistance
while steering. This makes it difficult for the driver to
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turn the wheel and does not allow the driver to turn
it more than 4 degrees, regardless of how much force
they put in. In order to cause the denial of service, an
attacker must simply continuously send CAN packets
with the lowest possible identifier, all dominant bits. Due
to the access contention aspect of the CAN protocol
documented in the preceding sections, no real CAN
packets will ever be processed as nothing has higher
priority than an identifier containing all recessive bits.
It should also be noted that continuously playing this
packet before the vehicle is started will not allow the
vehicle to start.
3) Control Over Throttle: In [29], by injecting mali-
cious CAN packets, the authors were also able to control
the throttle of the Toyota Prius, albeit momentarily. For
this particular vehicle, the authors mention that there
are a couple of preconditions to being able to control
the acceleration by injecting CAN packets: first, the
CAN packets for acceleration must be directly replayed
from the Power Management ECU, the Engine Control
Module or the bridge connecting the two as it is not
visible from the standard OBD-II port, and second, for
the injected packets to have any impact on the acceler-
ation, the Internal Combustion engine must be engaged
and then disengaged. Also, attributing to the fact that
the Prius is a hybrid vehicle, the Internal Combustion
Engine is not always in charge of the acceleration
and therefore, forged packets to control the acceleration
cannot always be deemed reliable. However, note that
even a momentary, one-off acceleration is often enough
to cause serious accidents, either directly or indirectly
(for instance, by eliciting an impulsive action from the
driver).
4) Denial of Service: The authors of [6] discuss
a Denial-of-Service attack which exploits the error-
handling scheme of in-vehicle networks to shut-down
the healthy ECUs. They exploit the CAN’s error han-
dling mechanism for this attack: by repeatedly injecting
attack messages to increase the TEC of a healthy ECU,
they trick the CAN fault confinement mechanism into
thinking that the ECU is faulty and therefore, force it
to shut down. When an attack message is transmitted
with the same ID and at the same time as the actual
message from the victim ECU but with at least one
dominant bit (0) as opposed to the recessive bit (1) in
the corresponding position(s) of the other message, the
victim ECU experiences a bit error and thus, fooled into
increasing its TEC by 8. By repeatedly injecting such
messages, the TEC of the victim ECU increases past
255, and therefore, the victim ECU is forced to enter
bus-off mode where it disconnects from the bus. The
success of this technique is further enhanced by the fact
that upon detection of an error, the TEC increases by 8
while for each error-free transmission, it only decreases
by 1.
D. Vulnerability Assessment
Assessing vulnerability is an important task in iden-
tifying critical security pitfalls and understanding asso-
ciated risk levels. In this section, we overview existing
works that propose a systematic approach to assess the
vulnerabilities of various automotive attack surfaces. We
also look into methods and metrics that are clearly
defined to capture the vulnerability assessment process
and the output of such process.
In [43], the authors propose a quantitative method
for vulnerability assessment of automotive ECUs. Their
approach involves four steps to the vulnerability assess-
ment process: Attack Surface Collection, Vulnerability
Prediction, Vulnerability Finding Effort and Exploit Cre-
ation Effort. The authors define the Attack Surface as the
collection of all interaction opportunities with an ECU
which includes, but is not limited to, incoming data at
an ECU, third-party apps, reflash routines and hardware
attack surface spots. Next, the vulnerability of a surface
is estimated using the vulnerability density which is
defined as the ratio of security relevant defects to the
ECU code size. The vulnerability density can also be
approximated from a software’s defect density. Similarly,
the vulnerability finding effort is defined as the initial
setup effort summed with all individual attack surface
probing efforts. It can also be estimated as the product
of the expected number of vulnerability finding tries
and the average vulnerability finding effort. Likewise,
the exploit creation effort is defined as the sum of the
expected access effort, the expected basic exploitation
effort and the expected counter exploit mitigation effort.
Lastly, the expected ECU exploitation value is defined
as the sum of expected vulnerability finding effort and
the expected exploit creation effort.
IV. MITIGATIONS AND SECURITY MEASURES
In this section, we take a look into different security
measures that are being proposed in order to overcome
some of the security limitations of CAN. Here, we
categorize the security measures broadly based on the
underlying security principles they follow.
A. Security based on authentication
In existing literature, numerous security measures that
use some form of authentication have been proposed.
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The authors of [35] propose a delayed message au-
thentication based on compound message authentication
codes. The proposed scheme compounds every four mes-
sages sent from an ECU to another ECU and calculates
a MAC for the compounded message. The MAC is then
split into chunks of four and sent with subsequent four
messages. The receiver, therefore, requires 4 subsequent
messages to verify the authenticity of the 4 preceding
messages, hence the authentication is delayed. The algo-
rithm used to calculate the MAC is the 3GPP encryption
algorithm, KASUMI, used in Cipher Block Chaining
Message Authentication Code mode.
In [51], the authors propose CANAuth, a backward
compatible message authentication protocol for the CAN
bus. It utilizes out-of-band transmission through the use
of the CAN+ protocol [55] to perform authentication,
which allows for a maximum of 15 bytes for an au-
thentication message. Authentication under CANAuth
is a two-step process, starting with key establishment
followed by authentication. Key establishment requires
that each node on the bus has access to one or more pre-
shared keys, one for each group of related messages, i.e.
speed data messages, steering command messages, etc.
The transmittal node can now begin the authentication
process. The key establishment process is divided into
two messages, the first of which is divided into three
sections, 8 status bits, a 24-bit counter value, and an
88-bit random number. To begin key establishment, this
message is broadcast and all nodes possessing the correct
pre-shared key are able to generate a session key using
the counter value and the random number using HMAC
[2] with the pre-shared key. The counter value is in place
to guard against replay attacks as each node stores the
previously validated counter value and checks that the
currently received value is in fact greater than the stored
value.
Next, the transmittal node broadcasts a second mes-
sage containing the 8 status bits along with a 112-bit
signature comprised of a hash of the session key and
the counter value. Now, all receiving nodes are able to
validate that the transmittal node knows the session key
and is trustworthy. Finally, authentication can take place.
An authentication message again contains the 8 status
bits, a new 32-bit counter value, and an 80-bit signature
comprised of a hash of the session key and the new
counter value. Again, before authenticating, receiving
nodes must check the counter value to ensure that it is
greater than the previously stored value.
Another authentication protocol for CAN is proposed
in [15]. The proposed protocol is a lightweight broadcast
authentication protocol called LiBrA-CAN. LiBrA-CAN
was designed to address the shortcomings of CANAuth,
for instance, the impracticality of storing a key for
each CAN ID, and uses a progressive authentication
mechanism based on key splitting and MAC mixing
paradigms. MAC mixing allows for the integration of
multiple authentication codes while key splitting increase
the entropy of each mixed MAC. The Linearly Mixed
MACs increase the security as one wrong MAC corrupts
all other MACs and thus the verification of the mixed
MAC will fail on each of the associated keys.
The scheme basically uses a centralized authentication
setup consisting of a master node and slave nodes
connected to the CAN bus. All slave nodes register to the
master node as a part of the key sharing process and the
master node distributes the keys. Multiple tags, generated
by a tag generation algorithm are concatenated to build
the Mixed MAC. The tag verification algorithm outputs
1 if and only if the tag is valid, else it outputs 0. When
the master receives a data frame containing a message
from a slave, it checks if the counter integrated in the
data frame is up to date and queues the message for
authentication. Then, when it receives an authentication
frame containing a tag from the slave, it takes the
matching packet off the queue and authenticates it. If
the authentication is successful, it then authenticates the
tag to other nodes.
Likewise, in [14], the authors formulate a security
mechanism based on Trusted Communication Group to
enable authenticity and confidentiality in the CAN bus.
The concept revolves around the notion of a "Super-
Gateway", otherwise known as a Key Distribution Centre
(KDC), that generates and transmits group keys to ECUs
in each communication group. The protocol uses asym-
metric key cryptography for the key distribution phase
and symmetric key cryptography to encrypt subsequent
CAN messages. Each ECU stores its private key in a
tamper-proof memory while the public key of the KDC
is made available to all the ECUs. The membership of
the group is defined using the ECU’s Access Control List
(ACL) which is cryptographically signed by the vehicle
manufacturer to provide for its integrity. Each ECU can
only transmit messages to other ECUs in its group and
since the traffic is encrypted, the protocol achieves both
authenticity and confidentiality.
In [9], the authors propose an authentication scheme
and analyze its safety-security trade-off. The proposed
scheme computes an integrity tag for a given message
by hashing the message with an authentication key. The
integrity tag is then concatenated with the message and
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encrypted with an encryption key. In a nutshell, it uses
the MAC-then encrypt approach to ensure authenticity,
integrity and confidentiality of CAN messages. The
authors also compare the safety and security proper-
ties of other schemes for message protection, namely
ENC+CRC, plain+MAC and plain+CRC, against
the proposed ENC+MAC scheme. They conclude that
although Encryption has a stronger security property, it
directly influences the probability of residual error and
therefore, has a weaker safety property.
Another authentication framework, VeCure, is pro-
posed in [53] and is based on a concept of a trust
group. Basically, each ECU is assigned a trust level
based on how easy of a target the ECU is for an attacker.
Based on the trust levels, ECUs are then grouped into
different trust groups. While the high-trust group nodes
are able to compute authentication codes and therefore,
share a secret symmetric key, the low-trust groups are
not provisioned with this capability. In the initialization
phase, each ECU is assigned a unique 1 byte node
ID which is used in the generation and verification
of authentication codes. The node IDs along with the
symmetric key are stored in the flash memory of each
ECU in the high trust group.
Each data message from the high-trust group is fol-
lowed by an authentication message that embeds the
authentication information. Two bytes of authentication
message are used for the message counter. The message
counter together with a session number is used to protect
against replay attacks. The session number is initialized
for each driving session and stored on the ECU’s flash
memory. One-byte node ID, 4-byte message authentica-
tion code and 1-byte authentication marker make up the
remaining bytes of the authentication message. The com-
putation of the message authentication code is carried out
in two phases: a heavyweight offline computation and a
lightweight online computation. The offline computation
is carried out in advance and involves computing a hash
from the node ID, the session number, the overflow
counter, the message counter and the symmetric key, but
not the data. The data goes as a parameter to the online
computation along with the hash to compute the final
MAC.
In a more recent work, Kurachi et al. have pro-
posed a centralized authentication system for the CAN
bus, CaCAN [25]. CaCAN introduces the concept of a
monitor node, a node tasked with authenticating other
nodes on the bus. The monitor node and each ECU
share cryptographic keys which are used for computing
the message authentication code. The authorization keys
are stored in an anti-tamper memory of the monitor
node. This centralized authentication system requires a
hardware modification to the CAN bus as the monitor
node requires a special CAN controller, HMAC-CAN.
In this system, every data frame sent on the bus has
a MAC that is checked by the HMAC-CAN controller.
If the HMAC-CAN controller detects an unauthorized
message, it overwrites the unauthorized data frame with
an error frame in real time to destroy the unauthorized
message and eliminate its unwanted effects.
Another centralized authentication system similar to
CaCan is proposed in [50]. The proposed system con-
sists of a special purpose monitor node that is tasked
with the authentication of each ECU. In a nutshell,
each transmitting node calculates the MAC, attaches
a part of the MAC to the payload and transmits the
frame. The monitor node then verifies the MAC and
upon mismatch, it overwrites the message with an error
frame. The system is, however, different from CaCan in
other aspects. For instance, it uses mutual authentication
scheme where the monitor node verifies a part of the
digest and the transmitting node verifies the remaining
part of the digest. A random seed, generated by the
monitoring node and sent to the transmission node, is
used to generate the digest.
Similarly, in [42], the authors propose LeiA, a fully
backwards compatible authentication protocol for the
CAN bus. In this protocol, each participant stores a
tuple consisting of the CAN ID, a 128-bit long-term
symmetric key used to derive the session key, a 56-bit
epoch that contributes in the generation of the session
key, a 128-bit session key used to generate the MAC
and a 16-bit counter value embedded in the MAC and
sent with the messages. The sender and the receiver first
generate the session keys using the long-term key and
the epoch. The epoch is incremented each time before a
session key is generated and the counter is set to zero
after the generation of a session key. Before sending an
authenticated message, the sender updates the counter
and if required, the epoch. The sender then computes
the MAC with the session key, the counter and the data
and then transmits the counter, the data and MAC. After
receiving these values, the receiver verifies the MAC.
The protocol also allows for resynchronization if the
MAC cannot be verified.
Another CAN authentication protocol is LCAP [16],
which is a lightweight protocol that relies on a use
of a 2-byte magic number. The number is computed
using the hash function used in the TESLA [41] protocol
and appended to each message. To compute the magic
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number, the sender picks a random number and repeat-
edly applies a transformation function. The initial magic
number of each message is broadcast to all receivers.
As using the same magic number to authenticate all
the messages from a sender leaves a big security hole,
the protocol, instead, orders messages such that the first
message can be verified by applying the hash-function
once, the second message by applying the hash-function
twice and so forth. The protocol also defines two modes
of operation: Extended Mode and Standard Mode. In the
Extended Mode, the Extended Identifier field of the CAN
message is used to send the magic number whereas in
the Standard Mode, the magic number is sent in the
payload, thus consuming 2 bytes of the payload. To
further increase the security, in the Standard Mode, the
whole payload is encrypted using a symmetric key that
is shared between the sender and the receiver.
vatiCAN, another authentication mechanism for CAN,
is proposed in [38]. Like many other authentication
mechanisms discussed in this paper, vatiCAN uses a
separate CAN message for authentication purposes. An
authentication message with a different sender ID fol-
lows a critical message to be authenticated. However,
unlike other similar mechanisms, only selected mes-
sages are authenticated, thereby significantly reducing
the overhead of authentication. Also, only vatiCAN-
aware recipients authenticate the critical message. As
with other similar mechanisms, the execution of the
corresponding command is deferred until the reception
of the authentication message for the corresponding
critical message. If the authentication fails, the message
is discarded.
B. Security based on intrusion detection
Various authors have proposed different intrusion de-
tection methods for CAN bus. In [18], Hoppe et al.
discuss intrusion detection techniques that can be used
to detect potential attacks on the CAN bus. They dis-
cuss three detection patterns for this purpose: increased
message frequency, obvious misuse of message-IDs, and
low-level communication characteristics. The technique
to detect attacks based on increased message frequency
is based on the observation that many attacks involve
repeatedly injecting packets to the CAN bus which
results in higher than normal frequency of the corre-
sponding packets. On the other hand, misuse of message-
IDs refer to the fact that attackers often compromise
a node (typically, an ECU) to inject packets that look
like packets from some other nodes. As CAN is a
broadcasting protocol, the sending node also receives the
message. As such, a simple source ID functionality can
be added to each node to check for whether the current
message bearing a particular source ID was actually
generated by the corresponding node for that ID. Lastly,
detection patterns that involve low-level communication
characteristics are based on observing electrical signals
in the physical layer. When ECUs generate CAN mes-
sages, the CAN controller generates electrical signals on
the bus to broadcast the message. The signals generated
can be specific to a message type and the source ECU
which can be used to identify the sender of the message.
The authors of [13] propose an intrusion detection
method that leverages on the fact that each ECU in the
CAN bus sends its messages with a specific frequency.
As such, the interval between subsequent messages for
each ECU in the bus is constant. The proposed IDS
checks the arrival time of each message and verifies
its frequency. Since each message is associated with
an ID, the frequency of an incoming message can be
checked against the frequency of regular messages for
that particular ID. If the arrival time of a message bearing
an ID is less than the regular arrival time for that ID,
it corresponds to an attack and therefore, the IDS issues
an alert.
Some other similar intrusion detection methods that
use the frequency of CAN messages as a detection
pattern include the works in [45] and [48]. The hybrid
IDS proposed by the authors of [45] uses both attack
signatures and anomaly in CAN traffic frequency to
detect possible attacks. Basically, the IDS keeps a score
of anomalies in message frequency and whenever the
score hits a preset threshold, the event is identified as
an attack. Similarly, the flow-based anomaly detection
scheme discussed in [48] uses a sliding window approach
that computes the flow of the CAN packets in the preset
window and compares against a historical reference to
detect anomalies. The authors also explore the effective-
ness of the approach over a range of packet injection
frequencies to determine its practical limitations. Further,
the authors point out that, while the timing information
can be reliably used to detect anomalous packets, the
Hamming distance between successive packet data fields
is not an apt measure for the same.
Recently, more concrete IDS models that use message
frequency to detect intrusion have been developed. One
such model with a very high true positive to false
positive ratio is discussed in [32]. The model discussed
observes the CAN data for a few seconds and records the
timing information of CAN messages. It then uses this
timing information against future observations to detect
anomalies and potential attacks. The model also accounts
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for the possibility that even during normal events, CAN
messages may be lost because of collisions. Hence, the
observed timing information may be different from the
recorded timing information. To reduce the number of
false positives, the model requires that three consecutive
anomalies be detected before an alert is issued.
An entropy-based anomaly detection approach that
uses the measure of entropy to specify the normal
behavior of the vehicular system and change in entropy
as a potential attack is discussed in [33]. The scheme is
based on the fact that automotive networks are restrictive
in nature; each packet and its potential content is pre-
specified; the ID of a CAN message is correlated with
the semantics of the payload; the frequencies of many
messages are well defined and so forth. Put simply, the
vehicular system contains a low entropy and attacks
injecting new packets, manipulating the payloads or
jamming packets, in general, increase the entropy.
Some researchers have also explored machine learning
models that can be used to detect anomalies in the CAN
bus. In [22], the authors propose using a deep neural
network (DNN) to detect attack packets. The DNN takes
the data fields of CAN packets as inputs and outputs
a binary label that identifies the packet as normal or
malicious. Similarly, the authors of [28] use a machine
learning model to detect deviations in CAN traffic. The
proposed system uses a classifier to identify the field
types of the CAN messages. Once the field types are
identified, the messages are fit into a model similar to the
Ternary Content-Addressable Memory model. A set of
TCAMs is created for each message ID and all messages
that meet the properties of that message ID’S fields are
grouped in the same set. Any messages that do not fit into
a set are considered an anomalous. Likewise, in [27], the
authors propose a similar anomaly detection algorithm
based on the analysis of CAN messages. However, it
does not require the knowledge of specification of CAN
messages. The algorithm proceeds with its training phase
by building a reference model based on the identifica-
tion of recurring patterns in CAN message IDs during
its normal operation. The observed transition between
consecutive message IDs is captured in a data structure
called the transition matrix. In the detection phase, the
current sequence of message IDs is validated against the
transition matrix. If two consecutive message IDs do not
appear in the transition matrix, then the validation fails.
On the other hand, if the two message IDs appear in
the transition matrix but the transition is not marked,
then the transition matrix is updated by marking the
corresponding transition. This step essentially minimizes
the number of false positives.
C. Limitations of existing security measures
The first step in finding a secure and efficient security
solution for CAN is is to treat the problem at hand as
a performance vs security vs cost trade-off problem. In
other words, the solution should be cost-effective, meet
the real-time communication needs of the vehicle and
secure against potential cyber attacks. Although what
constitutes acceptable performance and what constitutes
acceptable security is not easily quantifiable, established
standards from other domains can be adapted to quantify
these metrics.
In addition to meeting the performance, security and
cost needs, the proposed solution must also be scalable
in that an increase in the number of ECUs should not
significantly hinder the performance, impact security or
increase cost. Further, it must also be ubiquitous and
applicable to vehicles from all manufacturers following
the CAN standard. And of course, while an improved
standard is around the corner, the transitory solution
must be backward-compatible with the current CAN
specification.
Unfortunately, despite numerous security solutions for
CAN being proposed over the years, barely any treat
the problem as a trade-off or succeed in finding an
acceptable range. All existing solutions have their limi-
tations, and how well they hold up to the performance,
security and cost needs of a vehicle is not readily
understood. For instance, most of the authentication
measures proposed in the existing literature require a
second authentication packet that follows a data packet.
Clearly, the authentication is delayed until the reception
of this packet. This engenders latency in communica-
tion and impacts the real-time communication needs
of the vehicle. Further, additional CAN messages for
authentication increase the residual error rate [9], [21].
Moreover, some authentication mechanisms need spe-
cialized central gateways which results in an increased
cost of production. Similarly, anomaly detection based
on frequency of CAN messages suffers from the problem
that non-periodic packet types are not handled properly.
Further, data-fields of packets are not examined, only
the timing, which makes the solution much less robust.
Similarly, most of the solutions that use machine learning
to detect anomalies have questionable versatility. Further,
how well all these solutions scale and whether they are
ubiquitous for all manufacturers is not known.
Perhaps, the most significant limitation of the majority
of proposed security measures is the vulnerability to
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. In [39], the authors
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show that a carefully crafted Denial of Service attack
can be mounted on the CAN bus even in the pres-
ence of intrusion detection systems that analyze CAN
messages to detect potential attacks. We also expect
authentication-based countermeasures to be ineffective
against DoS attacks as they do not prevent an attacker
from flooding the bus with a pool of CAN messages.
This underlying shortcoming can be attributed to the fact
that these countermeasures do not prevent an attacker
from injecting messages to the bus, i.e. they do not
prevent the production of CAN messages, rather, by
design, they only prevent consumption and usage of
maliciously injected messages.
V. AN EFFICIENT, COST-EFFECTIVE AND
INCREMENTALLY DEPLOYABLE SOLUTION FOR CAN
A majority of known CAN attacks involve injecting
packets to the CAN bus either locally or remotely. There-
fore, it is only logical to look for a solution that involves
filtering packets from unknown or compromised sources.
However, CAN packets do not carry source information
and therefore source-based filtering is not possible unless
additional meta-data is incorporated into the payload
itself, making firewall-like solutions inapplicable to CAN
without significant adaptation.
Notably, the majority of packet injection attacks on
CAN involve compromised ECUs mimicking some other
ECUs in the network. It is rarely the case that ECUs
that are directly responsible for an action such as
controlling vehicular speed are compromised. Rather,
an attacker compromises some other ECU and starts
injecting packets to mimic one or more ECUs that are
responsible for the action. For instance, in an adaptive
cruise control mode, the Engine Control Module and
the Adaptive Cruise Control System are two ECUs
responsible for controlling vehicular speed. However, in
none of the documented attacks, either of these ECUs is
compromised. Rather, other ECUs such as the Telematics
Control Module is compromised and packets are injected
to mimic the Adaptive Cruise Control System. Clearly, if
we could enforce a rule that the ECUs can only produce
packets meeting some predetermined specifications, such
mimicking behavior can easily be counteracted. This
observation immediately implies the need for a system
that filters packets at the source ECU rather than the
destination – a kind of reverse firewall, which, for lack
of a better term, we decided to call icewall.
An icewall can be installed between an ECU and
the CAN bus, filtering all outgoing ECU packets before
they are transmitted. An example installation of multiple
icewalls, where each icewall monitors an ECU that
potentially exposes a remote interface, is shown in figure
2. At its heart, an icewall monitors the corresponding
ECU and ensures that all packets originating from the
monitored ECU comply with preset rules regarding the
content of the packet. All outgoing packets that do not
meet its specifications are blocked and never make it
to the bus, thereby eliminating any potential mimicking
behavior. It should be noted that, by design, an icewall
is supposed to let all incoming packets through.
Fig. 2: A potential icewall installation on a CAN network
An icewall is also resistant to many Denial of Service
attacks. This is attributed to the fact that an icewall
prevents compromised low priority ECUs from injecting
high priority CAN messages and further, can be config-
ured to limit the frequency of outgoing messages. With
additional filter rules that disallow continuous injection
of active error frames once the threshold (as defined
in the standard) is hit, icewalls can be deployed as a
viable solution to defend against the majority of Denial
of Service attacks on the CAN bus.
A. Attacker Model
As an icewall is based on packet filtering, it can be
effective against a class of false packet injection attacks.
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In our attacker model, we assume that an attacker is un-
able to compromise ECUs directly responsible for safety-
critical actions (for instance, an Engine Control Module
or an Adaptive Cruise Control System responsible for
controlling the speed of a vehicle). This is a reasonable
assumption as, to the best of our knowledge, all practical
documented attacks involve remotely compromising a
secondary ECU (or a set of ECUs) and injecting packets
to mimic behavior of other ECUs [31], [34].
Next, we assume that the attacker has remote wireless
access to the vehicle (and thus can interact with, and
possibly compromise, any ECUs with wireless commu-
nication capabilities), and that the only direct physical
access is limited to the OBD-II port. In this case, an
icewall can be an effective defensive measure, primarily
because it can be installed only where needed rather than
at every ECU like a firewall. For instance, if we assume
the attacker can only access a vehicle remotely, icewalls
can be installed for all those ECUs that expose remote
interfaces, as shown in Figure 2. Similarly, if we assume
the attacker can also inject packets through OBD-II port,
the OBD-II port itself can be secured with an icewall.
A non-hardware-controlling adversary is a reasonable
assumption in this case, since any attacker with direct
access to the vehicle’s components would be able to
physically remove an icewall (or a firewall), or replace
the entire ECU-icewall combination with a malicious
device. Such an attacker may further reverse-engineer
any ECU, or directly recover any secret keying material
from the ECU’s non-volatile memory or key-generation
component, thus rendering most of the proposed de-
fense mechanisms futile. Moreover, any potential de-
fense mechanism that could deal with such an attacker
would most likely be undesirable, as it would interfere
with vehicle manufacturing, servicing and after-market
customization.
B. Icewall Configuration
An icewall device can be installed as an OEM device
or as an aftermarket equipment. Further, an icewall can
be manually or automatically configured; the manual
configuration of icewall requires preprogramming filter
rules into an icewall device where modifying filter rules
can only be done by the vehicle manufacturer or an
authorized service personnel. Automatic configuration of
an icewall can be achieved by enabling learning abilities
into the icewall where it examines the first few incoming
packets and sets a filtering rule that permits only those
types of packets to enter the bus. An automatically
configured icewall, in essence, is an Intrusion Detec-
tion System with machine learning abilities. Also, for
automatic configuration purposes, an icewall device must
come equipped with a reset button that allows it to flush
its current filter rules and relearn new filter rules.
The automatic configuration of icewall does not come
without its own problems, however. If an icewall is
installed to monitor an ECU that sends multiple packet
types, the installed icewall, in its learning phase, may
be unable to learn all types of packets that should be
allowed to enter the bus. All other packet types, even
the legitimate ones, will therefore be blocked. In this
case, for those ECUs, manual configuration of icewall
is desirable. Automatic configuration of icewall does
have its benefits, however. For one, icewall devices can
be manufactured as universal plug-n-play devices. This
clearly reduces the cost of a device as well as the effort
required to set up the device.
C. Limitations and Enhancements
Unfortunately, icewall has its limitations. One such
limitation is that it cannot prevent malicious packets that
meet the preset rules from entering the bus. As discussed
before, in a typical setting, this does not carry significant
safety ramifications. However, in a setting where human
judgment is taken into account, this limitation can have
noteworthy implications. As an example, let us assume
that an attacker has unrestricted access (for instance,
by exploiting a vulnerability) to the Radio Module of a
car–the Radio Module being monitored with an icewall.
Despite the presence of an icewall, the attacker can still
inject permissible packets. Assuming volume packets are
permissible, the attacker can craft and inject false volume
packets to suddenly turn up the volume. Such an action
can often be enough to distract a driver and cause serious
accidents, especially, while driving in high speed.
Human-in-the-Loop: To better elucidate the sub-
tleties of a human involvement in vehicle control, we
build an ECU Adjacency Graph6 shown in Figure 3. For
simplicity, we omit information about the actual data
that flow between ECUs. We can observe that there is no
path of data flow from the Combination Meter Assembly
to the ECM. Therefore, assuming that all ECUs are
secured with icewalls, we do not see any obvious way
for an attacker to control functionalities of the ECM
(for instance, the acceleration) by compromising the
Combination Meter Assembly. Unfortunately, with the
introduction of a human driver in the control loop, the
setting changes. With the human driver involved, it is
now possible for the attacker to leverage on the driver’s
6The adjacency graph is based on the information obtained from the
service manuals and data-sheets of various Toyota vehicles
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judgment to indirectly control the ECM functionalities.
For instance, by displaying a false speedometer reading
on the display, the attacker could motivate the human
driver to accelerate or decelerate the car. Note that the
attacker does not have to inject false speed packets to
the bus (by mimicking the Adaptive Cruise Control,
for instance), rather she only has to display a false
reading on the dashboard. Although the Combination
Meter Assembly is an unlikely attack vector, we stress
that the concept holds true in general. In essence, with
human involvement, the possibilities are unlimited.
Fig. 3: Adjacency graph reflecting the data flow (directed
edges) between ECUs (nodes)
Various enhancements to an icewall are possible that
not only limit potential damages in the aforementioned
attack setting, but also makes an icewall more robust.
One potential enhancement is to configure an icewall
such that it not only examines the type of an outgoing
packet but also its payload. This is particularly handy
to detect abnormal readings in the packet data and
block the packet. For instance, for regular cars, it is
improbable that a car abruptly accelerates in a fraction of
a second. Malicious speedometer display can therefore
be potentially characterized by abnormal acceleration
readings. By configuring icewall such that it blocks all
packets with abnormal readings, it is therefore possible
to limit the consequences of imperfect human judgment.
VI. CONCLUSION
The security limitations of the CAN bus communi-
cation protocol can be attributed to the fact that the
CAN standard was primarily developed to meet the real-
time communication needs without significant concern
for security. The ever increasing trend of adding remote
interfaces to electronic control units inside modern ve-
hicles only makes the problem worse. Over the years,
researchers have identified numerous security problems
which include multiple ways to gain access to the bus
and several critical vehicular functionalities that can be
abused. Further, the limitations of the protocol hinders
the development of a simple, cost-effective and efficient
solution. Consequently, despite numerous security solu-
tions being proposed, the existing solutions carry notable
trade-offs in terms of efficiency, cost or security. Surpris-
ingly though, there exists a simple fix that is efficient,
cost-effective, secure and incrementally deployable: a
reverse-firewall. Referred to in this paper as an icewall,
our observed fix can be effective against a major class
of packet-injection attacks and many denial of service
attacks. However, it can be vulnerable to some attacks
that leverage on a human driver’s imperfect judgment to
manipulate vehicle controls.
Future work will be focused on practical implementa-
tion of the icewall. The implementation will entail prac-
tical tests to determine optimal configuration parameters
to make icewall more robust. Further, actual numbers
on the efficiency, cost of deployment and installation
overhead will be determined. The results will allow
objective comparison of icewall against other security
measures.
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